




It has never been easy to locate and identify values in relation to nature. The Greeks 
were already aware of the distinction between nomos, or variable custom, and 
physis, or the way things are. This sense of an opposition between what is culturally 
local and variable and what is fixed and given in nature has only grown sharper 
with the advent of modernity and the increasing credibility of materialist meta­
physics. That birds lay eggs or that water quenches fire seem to be matters of fact, 
while that Bach’s French Suites are beautiful or that Socrates is virtuous seem to be 
more problematic matters of value.
At the same time, however, there is a great temptation to see such matters of 
value as at bottom matters of a special kind of fact. Making judgements of value is 
important to the conduct of cultural life, and there is enough consensus and argu­
ment about them at least to suggest that such judgements indeed track something, 
rather than being reflexes of what one might call mere taste or idiosyncrasy. The 
disciplines of aesthetics and ethics have consisted largely of various strategies for 
locating and identifying the relevant special facts that are tracked by judgements of 
value, pre-eminently judgements of beauty and artistic goodness, and judgements 
of duty and goodness of character. Perhaps because of the shared contrast with 
judgements about the natural world or the putatively materially given, these discip­
lines have often developed parallel stances and strategies in addressing the natures 
of values. This chapter will explore these parallels, emphasizing the side of aesthet­
ics, and culminating in an assessment of a family of recent expressivist-holist views 
that dwell on continuities among aesthetic, ethical, and philosophical expression.
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Value realism supposes value properties to be real and discernible features of 
objects. Both the beauties of nature and art and the goodnesses of characters and 
actions are held to be in the objects that are judged valuable, though it may take 
special discernment to see them. Trained visual perception of single objects pro­
vides the model for the discernment of value properties. Plato notoriously accepts 
this model, and he equates beauty and moral goodness under the more general 
heading of to kalon: the fine.
Value realism drifts towards intuitionism when the primary focus is on the objects 
of judgement. In ethics, intuitionist views have been held by the early twentieth- 
century philosophers W. D. Ross and H. A. Prichard. In aesthetics, Mary Mothersill 
has claimed that certain assumptions of Plato’s ‘that beauty is (i) a kind of good 
(ii) which can be possessed by items of any kind and (iii) which is linked with pleas­
ure and inspires love... [are] basic in the sense that every theory has to take account 
of them and that they commend themselves to common sense... as fundamental 
truths’ (Mothersill 1984: 262). Philip Pettit has similarly argued that aesthetic char­
acterizations of objects as beautiful or grotesque, fine or flawed, dainty or dumpy, 
are genuine assertions about the properties of objects. Such characterizations are all 
at once essentially perceptual (one must look and see for oneself whether an object 
has an aesthetic feature), perceptually elusive (mere seeing of the object, without dis­
cernment, will not suffice to determine its aesthetic properties), and dependent on 
the positioning of the object in an unstable reference class of comparable objects. 
These features might suggest anti-realism. But because there are reasonable histor­
ical and hermeneutic constraints on the positioning of an object in a reference class, 
aesthetic properties are real enough, and ‘aesthetic characterizations... are... asser- 
toric in the strictest and most genuine sense of that term’ (Pettit 1983: 38).
The advantage of insisting that aesthetic or ethical properties are real and quasi- 
perceptually discernible is that the normativity of judgements of value is upheld. 
There is something in the object—^whether a character, an action, or a work—that 
a judgement about the object gets right or wrong. The disadvantage of such insis­
tence is that it risks under-appreciating dramatic historical and cultural shifts both 
in the vehicles of beauty and goodness and in the qualities needed to discern them. 
Subjectivity seems more present in both the production and the estimation of good 
characters and successful works than intuitionist views seem quite to allow. The 
beauty of a Greek temple seems different in kind from that of a Bartok quartet; the 
goodness of character of a Greek aristocrat seems different from that of a contem­
porary democrat. To concede that aesthetic and ethical characterizations are con­
text-relative, but to insist that they are about real features of things, seems like a 
defensive manoeuvre in the face of historical and cultural variability, an insistent 
but empty claim that correctness and incorrectness genuinely attach to judgements 
of value. Such views may not be wrong, but it is unclear how far their illumination 
penetrates into the details of our aesthetic and ethical practices and our critical 
judgements within them.
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A second, but closely related, form of value realism focuses more sharply on the 
special qualities of discernment possessed by apt aesthetic and ethical perceivers. 
The historical inspiration here is generally Aristotle rather than Plato, and attention 
is directed less towards fixed ideal qualities in objects than towards specific contex­
tual judgements of the goodness or badness of individual things in art and in life. 
The significant revival of virtue ethics over the last forty years or so, by such figures 
as Philippa Foot, Alasdair MacIntyre, Bernard Williams, Michael Stocker, Lawrence 
Blum, Michael Slote, and Martha Nussbaum, has been driven in large measure by 
particularism, or resistance to universal principles, coupled with a realist sense that 
the value properties of particulars can be discerned. (Both MacIntyre and 
Nussbaum have also articulated quite distinctive multi-dimensional general 
accounts of good human functioning.) On this view, our reasons for our specific 
judgements about value are enough to indicate that those judgements track some­
thing real, at least when those reasons survive wide-ranging critical scrutiny. We 
need not accept that only what is physically measurable is real. As John McDowell 
puts it, ‘What emerges here is the possibility that the explanation of [our] percep­
tions as reflecting ways of life might not amount to an explaining away of what the 
perceptions purport to discover in reality’ (McDowell 1983: 4, n. 5), however con­
textually specific such perceptions might be. Hilary Putnam’s internal realism sup­
ports a similar stance about judgements of both aesthetic and ethical value. We 
need not and should not, Putnam remarks, eliminate ‘the normative in favor of 
something else’ (Putnam 1992: 79), in favour of judgements about matter that are 
‘really’ objective. The costs for cultural life would be too high, and such judgements 
are metaphysically respectable.
Among contemporary neo-Aristotelians, Martha Nussbaum has dealt in most 
detail with specific judgements about the values of both particular works of literature 
and particular actions in highly specific contexts. Though a general theory of the 
good and reference to principle are necessary as part of the background to such 
judgements, one must also be ‘ “Finely Aware and Richly Responsible” ’ (Nussbaum 
1990:148), in the manner of Henry James, in order to make genuinely discerning eth­
ical judgements. The texture of the novelist’s attention to details of motivation, char­
acter, circumstance, tone, and style is what underwrites specific ethical assessment, 
against a background of principle. We seek, in ethical assessment, ‘the best overall fit 
between a view and what is deepest in human lives’ (p. 26), and Nussbaum’s critical 
procedure extends this search for a fit to the evaluation of specific literary works.
To the extent that these neo-Aristotelian value realisms offer multi-dimensional 
accounts of the good and very flexible appreciations of different virtues (of both 
character and art) in different contexts, they account well for the varieties of char­
acters, actions, and works of art that we value. But it is not always easy to see exactly 
how the particularism fits with the objectivism. When there is that much variety in 
judgements of value, often indexed to local cultural or historical circumstance, then, 
even if it need not he true, the thought that such judgements are mere expressions of
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individual or social preference looms. When, in contrast, the overall theory of the 
good or the beautiful is given more shape and content, so that common features of 
beauty or goodness in different particulars are discernible, then the particularism 
lapses. The middle way, of course, is to weave together the ongoing articulation of 
the general theory with specific value assessments, as the meanings of the general 
terms of the theory are explored in the specific, partly improvisatory work of aes­
thetic or ethical criticism. This is surely what Nussbaum has in mind when she 
remarks that the neo-Aristotelian style she practises will have to be ‘self-conscious 
about its own lack of completeness, gesturing toward experience and toward the 
literary texts, as spheres in which a greater completeness should be sought’ 
(Nussbaum 1990; 49). When this lack of completeness is emphasized, then the view 
verges more closely on the expressivist-holist views discussed below.
One peculiarity of modern strategies in aesthetics, in contrast with ethics, is the 
emphasis on the role of feeling in the apprehension of art and beauty. We seem less 
inclined than the Greeks to talk of beauties of the character, action, or person that 
we love or are moved by, perhaps because we are shyer than the Greeks about erotic 
attractions and wish to keep them separate from either ethical or aesthetic assess­
ments. Talk of being moved by art comes more naturally.
The exact way, however, in which feelings matter for the identification and appre­
ciation of art has been the subject of dispute. Most straightforwardly, feelings are 
sometimes regarded as means for both identifying and engaging with works of art. 
Judgements about art are here regarded, in Jerrold Levinson’s apt phrase, as ‘human- 
sensibility-indexed’ (Levinson 1998a; 8). How we feel in apprehending an object is 
part of how we figure out what it is and how we rightly make use of it. Echoing Plato, 
but eschewing his comprehensive account of to kalon, Richard Miller argues that 
aesthetic judgements, involving feelings, are objective when and only when they are 
‘learning-like enough’, yet without serving any ‘interest in acquiring truths’ or in 
making decisions (Miller 1998; 54). His idea is that by engaging with works of art we 
explore our capacities for feeling, and so learn something about ourselves, in particu­
lar about our capacities and about the objects we might enjoy in the future. As Peter 
Railton puts it, ‘we wish to create and surround ourselves with objects that can be 
rich sources of rich, perceptually based pleasure, objects moreover that will provide 
the occasion for shared pleasures among family and friends, that will call forth the 
admiration of others, and that will afford deeper satisfaction the better we know 
them’ (Railton 1998: 78). Alan Goldman similarly argues that
moral and aesthetic judgments refer to relations between nonevaluative properties (them­
selves relational) of their objects and responses of ideally situated evaluators.... Attention 
to paradigm works educates one as to the sorts of aesthetic properties or relations to seek in 
other works themselves unique. Argument on a set of paradigms also establishes a reference 
class of critics who share taste.... Aesthetic education of this sort, while not as vital to the 
continuation of society as is moral education, is vital to the continuation of its culture. 
(Goldman 1990: 718, 730)
726 RICHARD ELDRIDGE
Lacking, however, any general theory of the good other than a very abstract util­
itarianism, Miller, Railton, and Goldman have difficulty explaining exactly why this 
learning is either urgent or objective. Much of it seems to be a matter of coming to 
feel whatever others in general, or intimates, or those of high status in one’s culture, 
feel—or, if not that, then a matter of enjoying whatever one enjoys. For this reason, 
Stuart Hampshire, who holds a similar view about the nature of aesthetic properties, 
draws the conclusion that, unlike morality, which we must have, ‘a work of art is 
gratuitious. It is not essentially the answer to a question or the solution to a pre­
sented problem’ (Hampshire 1952: 652). When feelings, and especially pleasure and 
enjoyment, are made so central to the experience of art, independently of any fur­
ther functions, then the empirical claim that we, or some of us, are enough alike 
either to enjoy the same things or to esteem the same evaluators seems forced. It is 
an attempt to erect a philosophical fact about what might be called the enjoyable as 
such, in the face of considerable evidence to the contrary. Since morality is gener­
ally thought to be urgent, it is no surprise that there has been little talk in recent 
moral philosophy of the morally enjoyable as such, though Hume, of course, held 
such a view, in moral theory as in aesthetics. We would be better off, contra 
Hampshire, to regard works of art as a solution to a problem, if the objectivity of 
judgements of taste is to be upheld. As Eva Schaper has argued, it is a mistake ‘to 
seal off the aesthetic tank hermetically from the wide waters of philosophy’ 
(Schaper 1983a; 39), as Hampshire does. But what problem does art answer to, if we 
are not to talk of the objective achievement of to kalon, of the fine as such?
The most prominent and promising way to specify a general problem of human 
life that is not that of the achievement of the objectively beautiful and good, inde­
pendent of human sensibility, is in neo-Kantian terms. The problem defining 
human life, according to Kant, is that of the proper expression of our capacity for 
autonomy. This problem is set for us within, by the fact that we have free will, and 
hence can be more than playthings of external forces. As Paul Guyer usefully sum­
marizes Kant’s stance, ‘moral worth attaches to the active use of our free will, rather 
than to any inclinations we have, precisely because it is what distinguishes us from all 
other animals as mere products of nature’ (Guyer 1993:347). One must seek to achieve 
self-mastery, or Oberherrschaft (p. 349), in acting according to a self-legislated moral 
principle.
A major preoccupation of recent neo-Kantian moral philosophy, at the hands of 
Onora O’Neill, Christine Korsgaard, Marcia Baron, Barbara Herman, Allen Wood, and 
Richard Eldridge, among others, has been to show that the pursuit of Oberherrschaft 
need not commit one to moral rigorism or to the denigration of feelings or personal 
relationships, contrary to the criticisms of Kant made by particularists and virtue the­
orists. In order to make this case, it is typically emphasized that ‘our sentiments and 
inclinations are plastic’ (Guyer 1993: 367). As a result, ‘reason can... operate upon 
initially unruly and polymorphous passions, partially transform them, and thereby 
attach our inclinations and feelings to actions and ongoing modes of activity... that
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have been taken to express respect for persons’ (Eldridge 1989:45). Eldridge has then 
turned to certain works of narrative literature as offering exemplars of this trans­
formative education of feeling.
This line of argument relies upon and endorses the task that Kant specifically 
assigns to art in The Critique of Judgement. Through symbolic representation, 
works of art can ‘make moral ideas evident to the senses’, as Guyer (1993: 39) puts 
it. ‘The rational autonomy that underlies morality... can be made palpable to fully 
embodied rational agents like ourselves’ (p. 19). Such a stance runs evident risks of 
both aesthetic didacticism and moral rigorism, if the most successful works of nar­
rative art are taken to be stories of protagonists smoothly doing the right thing and 
living happily ever after. Eldridge has emphasized, however, that there are at best 
only‘partial and anxious exemplars’ (Eldridge 1989:187) of the achievement of self- 
mastery. Drawing in detail on Kant’s historical and anthropological essays, he has 
argued that, for Kant and in fact, ‘every exercise of power or virtue, every act of 
originality or courage or kindness or justice or love that we might look to as 
advancing our culture, will be at the same time marked by vainglory and antag­
onism’ (Eldridge 1996a: 184). And yet, the ideal of free expressiveness coherently 
draws us, in art as in life. The difficulty that this complex view faces is to make evi­
dent the roles in our arts and lives of such abstract ideals as freedom, self-mastery, 
and free expressiveness. Erom a more naturalist point of view, it may well seem that 
human life and art are much more about eating, sleeping, procreating, and enjoy­
ing than about these ideals. This criticism can be met only by tracing in detail what, 
in art and in life, we truly care about.
Just as this neo-Kantian line of thinking brings the function of art into connec­
tion with the conduct of life, so the most important work on value of the last forty 
or so years has seen the philosophical activity of thinking about value as itself tak­
ing place within the conduct of life, rather than through the discovery of fixed 
philosophical facts about either ideal forms or human nature. Inspired significantly 
by the work of the later Wittgenstein, expressivist-holist views see critical assess­
ments of particulars, both aesthetic and ethical, and more general remarks about 
the kinds of things that are worth doing and making, as interrelated, ongoing, con­
tested, conversationally arguable moves within ongoing human life. Here Iris 
Murdoch talks of the importance of attention—all at once aesthetic, ethical, philo­
sophical, and specifically critical—to ‘the texture of... being’ (Murdoch 1956:39), as 
it is developed both in one’s own life and in the lives of others. Human life is seen 
as requiring continual thoughtful redirection, never as the complete achievement 
of an ideal shape. As Murdoch puts it, ‘There are innumerable points at which we 
have to detach ourselves, to change our orientation, to redirect our desire and refresh 
and purify our energy, to keep on looking in the right direction: to attend upon the 
grace that comes through faith’ (Murdoch 1992: 25). Making and closely following 
works of art are paradigms of close attention to life, carried out within life. ‘Art is 
informative and entertaining, it condenses and clarifies the world, directing attention
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upon particular things__ Art illuminates accident and contingency and the
general muddle of life..(p. 8). There are, always, things to get right about human 
life, from within human life. Art, ethics, and philosophy all partake in this ongoing 
effort.
Within this expressivist-holist paradigm, there is less talk of right action or duty 
uberhaupt and more attention to the display and development of character in con­
text; there is less talk of autonomous beauty or significant form and more talk of 
the uses of art in embodying and clarifying specific visions of things. In this vein it 
is natural for Eva Schaper to remark upon analogies between close attention to an 
artistic object and love for another person, where both are ‘not self-regarding but
not self-forgetting either in the absorption in the loved one__ The emotion of love
permeates the entire life of the person who loves. And so it is also with the pleas­
ures of taste’ (Schaper 1983a: 51). Here there is no separating off of ethics from 
aesthetics, or of critical attention to particulars from broader reflections. As 
R. M. Hare puts it, ‘It is as if a man were regarding his own life and character as 
a work of art, and asking how it should best be completed’ (Hare 1965: 150). 
‘To become a mature moral person’, in Marcia Eaton’s formulation, itself ‘requires 
aesthetic skills’ (Eaton 1997:361).
Such expressivist-holist views carry evident risks of aestheticism. Everything 
seems to be a matter of pattern or arrangement. The boundaries between aesthetics, 
ethics, philosophy, and criticism seem tenuous, and the idea of really getting right 
what is required of us by our nature, by our wills, by God, or by the good seems 
threatened.
One neo-Nietzschean reply to this worry, urged by Alexander Nehamas, is to 
embrace the thought that ‘artistic decisions provide the model for all action’ 
(Nehamas 1996: 233), but then to argue, first, that in both art and life there are 
always enough contextual considerations available to point to something specific, 
and, second, that we should free ourselves from a cowardly ‘metaphysical’ urge to 
justify our choices from everywhere and nowhere. It remains to be seen, however, 
whether this form of aestheticism is adequate to guide choices in context and 
whether it can either answer or undo our intuition that there is something more 
than contextual that such choices aim at getting right.
Richard Shusterman has attempted to provide somewhat more normative con­
tent for this kind of view by reminding us that art has ‘deep roots in life’s needs and 
interests’ (Shusterman 1997: 6), as Nietzsche, Foucault, Wittgenstein, and Dewey aU 
held. In a specifically Deweyan vein, Shusterman then goes on to suggest ‘somatic 
exploration’ (p. 34), or an exploration of the body’s possibilities of movement and 
response, as in dance or as in the Alexander technique, which Dewey himself prac­
tised, as one valuable route of artistic self-making, alongside others. His emphasis on 
the body is meant to temper both a freer, more thoroughly Nietzschean, eclectic aes­
theticism and a Rortyan insistence on a distinction between public justice and pri­
vate self-experimentation. The body is present in manifold forms of practice, both
AESTHETICS AND ETHICS /29
public and private, and its claims can tell us specifically how we ought to cultivate 
ourselves, Shusterman urges. It is not always easy to see, however, just what these 
claims are and exactly how they should be balanced against the claims of, say, wit 
or justice or integrity. As in other varieties of this expressivist-holism, the details 
will be crucial.
Ted Cohen has pursued a more distinctively neo-Humean stance within this 
expressivist-holist framework, in the context of a study of jokes. If one becomes 
estranged from one’s natural emotional life, then one faces ‘a threat to one’s con­
ception of his own humanity’ (Cohen 1999: 26). Eschewing the demand for abstract 
proof in matters of value, we should speak from who we emotionally are. It is 
absurd and incomprehensible that we should be aware of our own deaths and 
hence, unlike other animals, be open to guilt, love, reciprocity, melancholy, and preju­
dice. We are responsible for the shapes of our lives, but we do not know how to 
discharge that responsibility, and we inherit many bits of style and sensibility, in 
tangled ways, from our families, cultures, and embodiment. In the face of all this, 
‘laughter is an expression of our humanity, our finite capacity, our ability to live 
with what we cannot understand or subdue’ (Cohen 1999: 41). In laughter we are 
‘joined in feeling’ (p. 25) with some others and with ourselves, at least for a time, 
and it is not clear that we can do much better than that. Cohen is acutely aware of 
both the humour and the absurdity of his own remarks, expressing his own feel­
ings. If there is a difficulty with this expressivist-holist neo-Humeanism, it is, as 
with Humeanism in general, that little attention is paid to the point that Kantians 
emphasize: the plasticity of feeling and its openness to transformation through 
reflection.
Robert Pippin has recently given a distinctively Hegelian turn to the expres­
sivist-holist sense of the ongoing construction of a life. According to Pippin, what 
we, at least in modernity, aim at is the freedom of self-understanding, where one 
can ‘only comprehend [one’s life] as one’s own in the freely given recognition by 
others’ (Pippin 2000:164). The expressivist catch against Hegel is that freedom ‘has 
no unambiguous realization’ (p. 157); we are instead always caught up in sociality as 
a play of ‘endlessly struggling, mutually reflecting, refined, interrogative, imagina­
tive consciousnesses’ (p. 162). A kind of guarded achievement of freedom is pos­
sible, involving an intimate mixture of ‘tragic self-renunciation’ (p. 166) with 
‘having one’s own life’ (p. 168), as one comes to terms with one’s particular place in 
this play. Pippin’s central figure for this achievement is Lambert Strether in Henry 
James’s The Ambassadors, when Strether decides to renounce both Maria, who loves 
him, and Mme de Vionnet, with whom he may be in love, and return to America. 
Pippin takes Strether’s closeness of attention to his situation and James’s attentions 
to the complexities of desire, relationship, material circumstance, history, glance, 
and voice to be models of the exercise of modern moral intelligence in the con­
struction of a life. It can be argued against Pippin that there is also either a principle 
that does or ought govern such attentions and constructions (as neo-Kantian
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expressivists such as Eldridge hold), or a general, multi-dimensional theoretical 
conception of the good that should inform deliberation (as neo-Aristotelian expres­
sivists such as Nussbaum hold). Without some such more fixed background struc­
ture, Pippin’s view risks collapsing back into the more aestheticist-contextualist 
position of Nehamas.
Very early on, Stanley Cavell cast the problem of human life as that of living both 
between and amidst avoidance and acknowledegement of others. It is little exag­
geration to say that his reception of Wittgenstein’s opening up of this sense of 
human life has been the most striking, detailed, continuous, and self-conscious 
working out of an expressivist-holist stance over the past thirty-five or so years. 
Cavell began this work by taking from Wittgenstein the sense that we are both 
bound to ordinary language, as the enabling background to any distinctively 
human thought and perception, and yet are in resistance to it, wanting to go our 
own ways, to achieve independence in our stances, and to escape the demands of 
acknowledgement of the ordinary. Working from this sense of human life, Cavell 
argued in ‘Aesthetic Problems of Modern Philosophy’ {1969b), and again in Part III 
of The Claim of Reason (1979), that both aesthetic and moral argument are contin­
uously critical, involving the situated working out of a thought or perception, in a 
way that seeks agreement. Reason is displayed more in this working out, in critical 
claim-making in conversation with oneself and others, than in simply holding to a 
theory of value from which specific judgements deductively follow. Sounding the 
key note of expressivist holism, Cavell reads philosophical theorizing about value 
as one more move—sometimes deft, self-conscious, and self-revising, sometimes 
dogmatic and escaping into false certainties—within this critical claim-making 
activity. Scepticism provides Cavell with his central figure for the plights of 
thought:
Skepticism is a place, perhaps the central secular place, in which the human wish to deny 
the condition of human existence is expressed; and as long as the denial is essential to what 
we think of as the human, skepticism cannot, or must not, be denied. This makes skepticism 
an argument internal to the individual, or separate, human creature, as it were an argument 
of the self with itself. (Cavell 1988: 5)
Cavell has been unusually self-conscious about his own claim-making activity as 
a philosophical writer, as he seeks agreement with himself and with others. He typ­
ically follows tracks or traces of thinking, as they are produced by philosophers, 
including Emerson, Thoreau, Austin, Kierkegaard, and above all Wittgenstein, by 
writers, including Coleridge, Wordsworth, Kleist, and above all Shakespeare, and by 
filmmakers and their figures—Preston Sturges and Henry Fonda; Howard Hawks 
and Cary Grant; Josef von Sternberg and Marlene Dietrich. In this, he often explic­
itly recalls bits of his own progress along his own earlier tracks. Some readers have 
found Cavell’s tracings to be mannered rather than responsibly argumentative— 
unsettled, even antinomian, rather than objective. Given, however, the range and
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detail of his tracings of thinking about value, as they occur in all sorts of situations 
and media, this charge seems more than anything else a sign of mere impatience and 
of a general wish for definite results within a weU-demarcated discipline of philosophy. 
In matters of value, this may be a wish that it may be more reasonable to forgo.
People have historically found a spectacular variety of things to be of value— 
good or beautiful or honourable or deep or absorbing. There is no settled method­
ology for constructing a theory of value. How to think about values at all is one of 
the standing topics of both aesthetics and ethics. Yet we seem able sometimes to 
give persuasive reasons in some contexts for some particular judgements of value. 
Given these facts, it seems likely that the most fruitful work in both aesthetics and 
ethics for the foreseeable future will take place within the expressivist-holist frame­
work. Whether that work is neo-Aristotelian, neo-Humean, neo-Kantian, neo- 
Hegelian, or neo-Nietzschean in sensibility, the effort will be simultaneously to 
sustain particular judgements of value persuasively and to articulate a general way of 
looking at values, where these joint efforts will be part of the ongoing self-conscious 
construction of a point of view. Certainly no more fundamentalist views, which 
would settle things once and for all, seem quite available.
David Wiggins, in worrying about how to think about values and the meaning of 
life other than in fundamentalist terms, has usefully described the basic features 
of the expressivist-holist stance. We need, he suggests, to accept ‘the compossibility 
of objectivity, discovery, and invention— We need to be able to think in both 
directions, down from point [purpose or end] to the human activities which 
answer to it, and up from activities to the forms of life in which [human beings] by 
nature can find their point’ (Wiggins 1976: 371, 374-5)- This kind of double-aimed 
thinking has been carried out at the intersection of aesthetics and ethics, in think­
ing about the artful and meaningful construction of a life, to the mutual enrich­
ment and profit of both disciplines.
See also: Art and Morality; Art and Emotion; Tragedy; Value in Art; Expression in 
Art; Aesthetic Realism 1; Aesthetic Realism 2.
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